1 WHITE PAPER AIR MOBILITY COMMAND GLOBAL EN ROUTE STRATEGY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

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WHITE PAPER

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND

GLOBAL EN ROUTE STRATEGY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

The current strategy for our en route system is based on the results of the 1995 Mobility

Requirements Study-Bottom Up Review (MRS-BURU) with refinements by mobility

capabilities studies in 2000 and 2005. The Global War On Terror has raised questions on the

validity of the current mobility en route system’s sizing and alignment. Furthermore, the

evolution of air mobility aircraft, operations, and various stressors on the en route system

indicate a need to reevaluate the capabilities required in the en route system.

The current National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy provide the

baseline for what our mobility strategy should be capable of achieving. The Nation’s emphasis

on global alliances, economies and responsibilities mandates global access and especially access

to strategically important areas of interest. Therefore, the goal of the proposed AMC en route

strategy is global access allowing the full spectrum of passenger and cargo movement.

The Areas of Interest, defined as continuing zones of hostility or instability or areas prone

to natural disasters and having the greatest need for airlift support, are identified as Southwest

Asia, Southeast Asia, Korea, Africa, Eurasia, and Indonesia. Accordingly, the en route lay-down

and infrastructure must be able to support a heavier flow to these regions. In addition, the

resulting strategy accounted for political sensitivities and was optimized for a presumed tight

fiscal environment. Finally, while the existing strategy maximizes the operational capabilities of

our mobility platforms, the new strategy must accommodate the limitations of services and

support in those locations we could be asked to transit.

In this proposed strategy, unlike in previous en route strategies, we’ve factored in the

family of tanker assets in our approach. While A/R assets have the ability to extend airlifter’s

range, this factor was not considered in the previous en route system strategy’s structure,

primarily because the system is designed to be responsive to worst-case scenarios, i.e., A/R

assets not being available to refuel airlift assets.

The previous strategy was based on the ―lens,‖ or ―sweet spot‖, for strategic airlift

operations, describing physical and technological limitations of the strategic airlift fleet

overlayed on the geographic landscape. The lens concept will be no less valid in 2025 than it

was when it was first conceived; however, in the proposed strategy we will refine its utility. The

new strategy does break from the historical view of a ―location-centric‖ en route concept which

promotes viewing the en route through its individual locations rather than as an interdependent

system. This perspective could result in decision-making that fails to consider the effect on the

entire strategy. For example, efforts to reroute airlift flow to certain locations in order to reduce

fuel consumption fail to account for the impact on the entire en route system. Instead, the

proposed strategy adopts a system of mutually supporting routes, allowing one to more readily

see the en route as a system of interdependent capabilities rather than a loose collection of

locations. The Atlantic and Pacific route systems are described below.

The Atlantic Route Strategy: We propose that there are three primary routes for

supplying the warfighter—northern, central and southern. These Atlantic routes have the

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advantage of providing overlap for each other. This feature of the Atlantic routes leads us to

postulate an alternate name for the Atlantic strategy—―Three-Use-Two.‖ In other words, we

have three routes across the Atlantic, and for any given action in one of the areas of interest, two

of the routes are available for delivering supplies to those areas. Should one route become

restricted or unavailable for whatever reason, political, meteorological, operating hours,

saturation, etc., supplies can be diverted through the additional supporting route.

The Pacific Route Strategy: We acknowledge in the Pacific that there are two primary

routes to supply the warfighter. We expand on the original ―2-Lose-1‖ strategy by proposing a

―Two Route Plus‖ option. The strategy still utilizes the Northern and Southern routes. However,

overlap of the routes, as seen in the Atlantic Strategy, is less feasible due to the geography of the

Pacific structure. Therefore, the ―Plus‖ alludes to our refinement of the strategy and enhances

the original ―2-Lose-1‖ strategy by mitigating choke points that might hinder flow.

Next, in an effort to facilitate the flow through the route structure mentioned above,

capabilities at each en route location must be identified. Maintenance and aerial port capabilities

are combined into general definitions to capture the full spectrum of required logistics

capabilities. These definitions are categorized into a four tier system. First, Tier I locations have

both major maintenance capability and full hub/spoke distribution service aerial port capability

(may include full break-bulk operations and robust passenger handling). Second, Tier II

locations are capable of minor maintenance, minor passenger handling, and trans-load, break-

bulk, flightline-to-truck dock ―customer receipt‖ aerial port services. Next, Tier III locations

have limited maintenance and limited aerial port services, to include passenger handling and

upload/download capability only. Finally, Expeditionary locations are stood up by deployed

personnel to provide limited maintenance, and aerial port capability, that can be sized as

necessary to full distribution service capability or limited ―customer receipt‖ capability. A table

of proposed en route locations can be found at page 31 of the white paper.

It is important to note that these definitions are general in nature and only meant to

provide a guideline for determining relative size. In fact, the maintenance and port capabilities at

any given location may not neatly fall into corresponding tiers. For instance, locations like

Aviano AB would be classified as a Tier III for maintenance, but a Tier II for port capabilities.

For a strategy to succeed, it must be implemented at the operational level, which implies

occasional subordination of operational efficiencies to the greater strategic need and desired

long-term effect. What we have learned over the years is that if locations aren’t used, they will

be lost, either to budget cutting measures or to host nation designs. To secure access to locations

required during contingencies or surges, we must be willing to operate in a distributed manner,

even if this means a loss of day-to-day efficiency. Finally, the strategy cannot be static. It must

adjust and adapt to changes in the National priorities, political landscape, and fiscal constraints.

To that end, we recommend that every two years, the command undertake a comprehensive

review of the en route strategy.

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WHITE PAPER

GLOBAL EN ROUTE STRATEGY

1. BACKGROUND:

The existing en route structure is rooted on bases held at the end of World War II. In

both the Pacific and European theaters, infrastructure held at the end of the armistices form the

backbone of our en route infrastructure nearly 70 years later. The modern strategy for our en

route system is based on the results of the 1995 Mobility Requirements Study-Bottom Up

Review (MRS-BURU). This study adopted the National Military Strategy of fighting and

winning two simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTWs) and proposed the mobility requirements

necessary to support that strategy. In 1996, AMC and USAFE, as part of an ad hoc en route

system working group, agreed that the requirements in MRS-BURU were valid and established a

requirement for six bases with sufficient capacity to allow for the loss of any one base.

Additionally, the agreement identified the need for two bases on the Iberian Peninsula, as well as

in Germany and the United Kingdom. However, in the same year, Spain denied access to

Torrejon AB and shortly thereafter, USAFE decided to end the Air Force presence at Zaragoza

AB. In 1998, USTRANSCOM and USEUCOM formalized the en route system working group

into what is known today as the European En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee

(EERISC) charged with advocacy responsibilities for mobility infrastructure in USEUCOM’s

Area of Responsibility (AOR). The EERISC then formalized the European en route basing

strategy, better known as the 6- lose-1 strategy.

In 1999, the Pacific En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee (PERISC) was stood up

as a parallel effort with the EERISC and established what’s become known as the 2-lose-1

strategy – basing along two primary routes with sufficient capacity to permit the temporary loss

of one route without excessively delaying the delivery of forces along the other.

Subsequent mobility requirements studies in 2000 (Mobility Requirements Study – 2005

(MRS-05)) and 2005 (Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS)) refined the requirements of the earlier

study but made no significant change to the en route system. MRS-05 became the justification

for a large number of infrastructure improvement projects in both the Pacific and European

theaters. As a note, the MCS stated that the overseas infrastructure, not the number of available

aircraft, remains the fundamental constraint when attempting to reduce delivery timelines

associated with large scale deployments.

In 2005, the National Military Strategy shifted from winning two simultaneous MTWs to

the 1-4-2-1+ strategy—to defend the homeland, operate in and from four forward regions, win

two overlapping campaigns, win decisively a single campaign and conduct a limited number of

lesser contingencies. Additionally, the stand up of USAFRICOM in conjunction with the on-

going Global War on Terror suggests that Africa could be viewed as a fifth ―forward region‖

which will require significant mobility capability to support the intent of the National Military

Strategy.

Today, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS)

emphasize the global nature of our commitments and obligations. To that end, the NDS states

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that ―The United States requires freedom of action in the global commons and strategic access to

important regions of the world to meet our national security needs.‖ (2008 National Defense

Strategy, p.22) Consequently, an air mobility strategy must be capable of providing the Nation’s

access to the strategically ―important regions of the world.‖

2. JUSTIFICATION FOR NEW STRATEGY:

The evolution of air mobility and the following stressors on the en route system point to

the need to reevaluate the capabilities required in the en route system:

 The National Military Strategy has shifted from a two MTW strategy to the 1-4-2-1+

strategy

 The events of 11 September 2001, resulting in the Global War on Terrorism

(GWOT), have dramatically altered the way we employ our military’s capability in

ways unforeseen in 1998

 Significant manpower reductions driven by Program Budget Decision (PBD) 720 will

require USAF and AMC to identify efficiencies and process improvements in the en

route system to best accomplish the mission within the reduced level of manpower

 The Air Force Smart Operations for the 21

Century (a process that re-engineers the

USAF, by eliminating steps that add no value to the end product or by combining

process steps to save time) has put intense scrutiny on the en route system as the Air

Force looks at avenues to save money and increase velocity

 The military has become more expeditionary in nature stressing the mobility

capabilities on a daily basis

 The other Services have modified their future systems acquisitions (e.g., the Army’s

Stryker program) which potentially increase their airlift requirements

 The establishment of Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and its implications, were

not included in the MRS-05 analysis; it will add a new combatant commander

(CCDR), whose mobility requirements will compete with other regional CCDRs

 The airlift fleet is significantly different in composition than that assumed and

proposed in MRS-05

 The next generation air refueling aircraft is programmed to have a cargo capability

which may require an expansion of cargo handling capability at locations traditionally

dedicated to aircraft that don’t routinely carry cargo (e.g., KC-135s) as well as may

require larger parking areas than required for KC-135s. In addition, extensive fuel

hydrant modifications may need to be examined to handle the new aircraft, as well as

the requirements for airframe-specific maintenance personnel and supply stocks

 The en route system, as championed in MRS-05, is airlift centric, focusing on a

quantifiable cargo handling capability (million-ton-miles), a metric that is not always

applicable

o Cargo and passenger generation, through-put and reception requires

significantly greater infrastructure than gas-and-go operations as does

workflow generated by strategic distribution—i.e., truck-to-truck flow,

seaport-to-airport flow, and seaport-to-surface movement flow

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o Did not explicitly deconflict the use of airlift ramps between AMC mobility

assets and other MAJCOM or CCDR/Service apportioned assets (e.g.,

USAFE/ PACAF C-17s, tankers, fighters, USN aircraft, and/or USA aircraft)

 The increased range and payload capability from the C-5M, and the increased range

capability of the extended range tank-equipped C-17s may extend the traditional

concept of the en route system to include capabilities closer to the warfighter

 Creation, approval, and implementation by USTRANSCOM, USEUCOM, and

USCENTCOM of the European Intermodal Distribution (EID) and Middle East

Intermodal Distribution (MEID) CONOPs in the 2006-2007 timeframe

 Changing nature of the threat (including MANPADs) that requires Defensive Systems

use, tactical approaches and arrivals, and transload operations

 Increase need for hot cargo pads to support deployment of Stryker units, FCS, and

MEFF-V with munitions as an integral part of the load

 Advent of Just-In-Time Logistics concepts

 The evolving nature of the battlespace (from Cold War’s linear, contiguous

configuration to a non-linear, non-contiguous paradigm) that will likely be much

more demanding of air mobility for deployment, supply, and redeployment

These factors point to the need to reevaluate the required capabilities in the mobility en route

system.

The GWOT has raised questions on the validity of the current mobility en route system’s

sizing and alignment. Realignment of US forces out of Korea and Japan will force changes in

OPLANS/CONPLANS, significantly expanding the role of Guam in the USPACOM AOR.

Likewise, within the USEUCOM AOR, USAFE has explored budgetary cost reductions through

base realignment, evaluated the range of the C-17/distances expected for a crew to transit, and

directed manpower reductions as a result of PBD 720. Concurrently, an increased drive to

improve velocity and precision, with decreased delivery times, has led to evaluating the current

and future force structure within the AMC En Route System.

3. STRATEGY REQUIREMENTS

A comprehensive study is needed to validate, modify, or recreate the mobility en route

structure. A fresh look at the en route system would first require a definition of what the system

encompasses (e.g. a shift from requirements driven modeling to capabilities based). The study

should use USTRANSCOM’s Distribution Process Owner (DPO) concept of factory to foxhole

vice Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) to Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) as a guiding

principle for looking at air mobility operations, focusing on the en route distribution portion.

The intent of this statement is not to focus on tactical-level destinations or homestation/CONUS

originating locations, but to ensure the inclusion of aerial ports that perform a substantial amount

of onward air movement, even if they also often serve as originating/ terminating locations.

Any study of the en route system capabilities should define the level of risk imposed by

fiscal realities, physical infrastructure, manpower, and supporting host unit services. It should

attempt to minimize the impact of those risks by adjusting the strategy to compensate.

Additionally, it should identify mechanisms and procedures to adjust the en route capability to

meet supported OPLAN requirements. It should also consider organizational structure impacts

on throughput capability.

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Furthermore, the reevaluation of the en route system should be strategic in nature. The

benchmark for whether a location would qualify as a strategic en route location should be based

on whether OSD (Executive Agent of USAF) would be willing to commit military construction

(MILCON) funds to, or seek Host Nation funding for, mobility infrastructure (MILCON

programming, funding and execution responsibility often falls on other services per DODI

4000.19). The commitment of these funds would signal a long term commitment to the mobility

mission at that location.

The final component of this study would initiate an established review of Cooperative

Security Locations (CSLs) identified within the CCDR Master Basing Plan. Using the en route

bases as the hubs, these CSLs would be the spokes that can be reached by each hub. More

importantly, the CSLs help to bridge the coverage gaps that exist. The CSL’s capabilities will

impact the size and location of more robust and permanent en route locations.

Millions of dollars have been invested in the current en route structure to support the

strategy laid out in MRS-05. The structure will likely remain intact; however, how the structure

will be used is a key question this study will address. At a minimum, the study will evaluate the

current en route system using the latest baseline information so it is responsive to changes in the

strategic environment.

The resulting strategy should be adopted as the minimum acceptable capability, identify

maximum allowable capability based on permanent infrastructure/equipment constraints, and

provide the basis for fiscal support from owning and using MAJCOMs and applicable services

(e.g., USN).

4. STRATEGY LANDSCAPE:

In 2007, in part responding to AMC’s proposal for a new study of the en route system,

USTRANSCOM began the Global Access and Infrastructure Assessment (GAIA). GAIA’s

stated purpose was three-fold:

• Examine global access and infrastructure supporting joint deployment and distribution

enterprise (JDDE)

– Access … can we reach and enter required areas

– Infrastructure … do facilities permit required operations

• Shape and inform the OSD-directed Mobility Capabilities & Requirements Study

(MCRS)

• Develop cohesive strategy to ensure global access and infrastructure, as necessary

The results of the study would be the foundation of a strategy allowing us to provide

transportation support, whether by air, land, or sea, anywhere on the globe.

Unguided modeling of the world would have been an enormous undertaking and may

have resulted in strategic direction that might not have provided adequate support to AMC global

airlift operations. Consequently, AMC, with the support of USTRANSCOM, undertook building

a high-level strategy informed by experience and intended to narrow the focus of the GAIA

research. The ultimate goal of the strategy is global access. However, focusing solely on global

access could result in misallocating resources, so the strategy should also focus on providing

coverage of key areas. These areas (Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, Korea, Africa, Eurasia and

Indonesia) are defined as continuing zones of hostility or instability or areas prone to natural

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disasters and have the greatest need for airlift support. Accordingly, the en route lay-down and

infrastructure needed to be able to support a heavier flow to these regions.

The goals of the AMC strategy are to fill the global coverage seams with the full

spectrum of passenger and cargo movement. The full-spectrum includes the least (minimum

required to operate an AMC aircraft) to most capability (comparable to that available at

Ramstein). This movement would be limited by political sensitivities (e.g., overflight

restrictions, etc.) and optimized for a presumed tight fiscal environment. This fiscal environment

would dictate that we optimize the use of existing infrastructure to maximize the return on prior

en route infrastructure investments while identifying the next level of investment required to

meet the strategy’s goal. The strategy should also maximize the operational capabilities of our

mobility platforms, but we must accommodate the limitations of services and support in those

locations we could be asked to transit.

A brief note on the scope of this strategy: Strategic or tactical airlift missions are

support- intensive enterprises. Large quantities of fuel are required, ramp space necessary to

handle large aircraft is often limited, and cargo handling equipment, distribution capability, in-

transit storage and the ability to handle passengers is required. On the other hand, some AMC

assets, (e.g., air refueling and DV/VIPSAM aircraft) are self-deploying requiring very little on-

site support. As long as parking space and fuel is available, they continue to operate.

Consequently, the focus of the strategy is on the basing and infrastructure requirements to

support the most demanding of the AMC assets—airlift. Finally, in order to be able to

reasonably establish military construction projects, if needed, the strategy will focus on the years

from 2015 to 2025.

5. STRATEGY ASSUMPTIONS:

Since the proposed strategy is a prelude to the analyses of the GAIA and MCRS-16, a

rather extensive set of assumptions had to be made. Some of the premises will continue to be

assumptions in the aforementioned studies, while others may be eliminated. However, the

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proposed strategy could not have progressed to this point without the following assumptions in

place:

 The global political landscape in 2025 is similar to the landscape today

 There will be no significant change in overflight restrictions

 In 2025, the strategic airlift fleet will consist primarily of C-17s

 A C-17’s unrefueled out-and-back radius is 2,000NM

 A C-17’s point-to-point distance is 3,500NM

 Since the airlift capability of the new air refueling design has not been fully vetted, its

capability was not considered.

 Every attempt will be made to maximize existing infrastructure within the strategy. In

other words, as long as existing infrastructure can fit into the new strategy, the strategy

should take best advantage of it

 In accordance with the President’s statement and the statements of member nations, no

permanent basing was planned on the African continent, except at Camp Lemonier,

Djibouti. However, an Expeditionary Air Mobility Squadron (EAMS), while not

specifically recommended anywhere in Africa by the strategy, should not be ruled out

except by robust analysis of requirements and routes

 CONUS locations and end of the strategic airlift routes were not considered part of en

route system. Some locations, Al Udeid for example, serve dual roles as APOEs and

APODs. In these cases, we will treat them as en routes

 Every attempt would be made to maximize throughput while minimizing risks to mission

success

 The strategy should maximize global coverage while concentrating on areas of concern

 The strategy would feed USTRANSCOM’s GAIA which would provide the analytic

underpinning and Joint Staff’s MCRS-16

Finally, a quick look at a globe will reveal a basic geographic fact-of-life—90 percent of

the world’s landmass is north of the equator. Not surprisingly, 90 percent of the world’s

population lives north of the equator. These two facts drive the east-west orientation of this

strategy. While not ignoring the existence of the 10 percent in the southern hemisphere, the

proposed strategy is heavily weighted toward the northern hemisphere.

6. DEFINITIONS:

The en routes are logistics-oriented organizations of aircraft maintenance and

transportation (freight, passenger, and aircraft comfort servicing) activities. To define the size of

an en route location, the size of the two logistics areas need to be scoped.

To that end, all references to maintenance capability conform to the definitions in the

AMC Supplement to AFI 21-101. En route maintenance capability falls into three categories:

major, minor and limited. AFI 21-101 AMCSUP 1 defines them as:

―Limited maintenance capability consists of general servicing tasks only. Minor

maintenance capability consists of general servicing tasks, and 2-level maintenance

component troubleshooting and remove/replace actions commensurate with MDS

Minimum Equipment List (MELs). Major maintenance capability consists of all items

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listed above, in addition to more in-depth troubleshooting for problem systems, and some

backshop level tasks. Level of backshop capability will be determined through host

tenant agreements/command to command agreements.‖ (A14.4.2.)

Aerial port capability is also broken into three categories, though they are not defined

with the same rigor as the maintenance capability. Port capabilities are described as large,

medium and small. They largely describe the manpower and facilities necessary based on

passenger, cargo and aircraft fleet servicing requirements.

Therefore, combining the maintenance and aerial port capabilities into a single definition

that captures the full spectrum of logistics capabilities results in the following definitions:

 Tier 1 = En route location with major maintenance and full service capabilities

 Tier 2 = En route location with minor maintenance and in-transit port capabilities

 Tier 3 = En route location with limited maintenance and limited port capabilities

 Expeditionary = En route location where all maintenance and port capability is provided

as the mission dictates and by deployed personnel

Capability

Tier I

Tier II

Tier III

Expeditionary

Operations

24/7 w/ AMCC

Less Than 24/7,

AMC Permanent

Presence

No Enduring AMC

Presence

Maintenance

WMOG = 3 Or

More,

R&R, Predictive Mx,

Limited Backshop,

2 Or More MDSs,

=> 15 Acft/Day

Throughput

WMOG = 1 Or

More,

R&R For 2 MDSs,

5-14 Acft/Day

Throughput

WMOG = 0 – 1,

0-4 Acft/Day

Throughput

As Mission Dictates

Rotational Forces

Refuel

20 WB W/in 24 Hrs,

Demand =

600K Sustained,

1M Surge

3M Gal Store

10 WB W/in 24 Hrs,

Demand =

300K Sustained,

500K Surge

1.5M Gal Store

5 WB W/in 12 Hrs,

Demand =

150K Sustained,

200K Surge

750K Gal Store

As Mission Dictates

Aerial Port

WMOG = 3 Or More

Wide-Body Acft

Full hub/spoke

services and

passenger handling,

provides full-

spectrum to limited

distribution services

(multi-modal) in

support of DPO

mission, may include

full break-bulk and

cross-dock operations

WMOG = 1 Or

More Wide-Body

Acft

Provides in-transit

aerial port support

and passenger

handling, to include:

trans-load,

moderate break-

bulk, flightline-to-

truck dock

“customer receipt”

aerial port services

WMOG = 0 – 1

Provides limited

aerial port services

and passenger

handling, to include:

import/export

capability only--can

expand services as

required with

manpower/equipment

augmentation

As mission dictates

rotational forces

initially established

with Air Mobility

Contingency

Response (port

opening) capability.

Can be sized as

necessary to meet

full distribution

capability or

limited “customer

“receipt”

capability.

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24/7 ops, 2 or more

controllers

24/7 ops, single

controller

less than 24/7 ops

As required

As can be seen, classifying locations by Tiers is not an entirely clean process across all

functional areas. The most obvious problem lies in trying to fit aerial port capabilities into the

Tier definitions. Classifying a location for port capabilities results in a significantly different

picture of the en route than classifying for operations and maintenance. For example, compare

the table on page 33 with the table at Appendix 3. However, while we recognize the differences

between port capability and operations and maintenance capabilities, the differences are not

significant enough to change the outcome of this paper.

7. GLOBAL STRATEGY:

The proposed global strategy that resulted from MRS-BURU provided an excellent

baseline for continued reviews of the en route strategy. In the European theater, it identified the

six locations for the first leg from the CONUS that proved crucial to continuing support to the

warfighter at more distant locations. In the Pacific theater, the 2-lose-1 strategy recognized the

lack of available real estate on which to establish a network of mobility support stops by

focusing on locations lying along routes.

The primary drawback to this ―location-centric‖ en route concept is that it promotes

viewing the en route through its individual elements rather than as an interdependent system.

This, in turn, can result in decision-making that fails to consider the effect on the entire strategy.

This becomes particularly evident during periods of constrained resources and efforts to extract

savings. For example, recent efforts to place Moron in a turnkey status focus solely on the

historical use of the airfield. Additionally, efforts to reroute airlift flow to reduce fuel

consumption fail to account for the impact on the entire en route system.

Consequently, this effort attempted to redefine the en route as a system of interdependent

capabilities that, taken as a whole, help meet the nation’s inherent interest in global influence and

projection.

It was determined that the strategy established in the Pacific theater actually did an

excellent job of framing the en route capabilities as a system. In the Pacific, the en route strategy

is based on the availability of two routes to the area of interest. The two routes are

interdependent and mutually supporting and it allows one to more readily see the en route as a

system of capabilities rather than a loose collection of locations.

To that end, this global strategy adopts the Pacific theater model of a route-based strategy

in the European theater and continues the model in the Pacific. The strategy abandons the

moniker of ―6-Lose-1‖ that was focused on individual locations in favor of a three route strategy.

The three routes are designed to service different areas of interest. Yet, they are mutually

supporting so that the airlift requirements in a given area of interest can be supported from any

two routes. This effort is intended to move the European en route from its location-centric focus

toward a holistic and systematic view.

8. AIR REFUELING (A/R) AND THE EN ROUTE:

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The Air Force’s air refueling capability provides the nation an amazing capability to

extend its reach to all segments of the globe. As stated in the 2008 Air Mobility Master Plan

(AAMP):

Air refueling is an important part of air mobility and serves to enable and

multiply the effects of airpower at all levels of warfare. The Mobility Air Forces’ air

refueling (AR) capability makes possible the intertheater air bridge operations

needed to support large deployments, humanitarian assistance, global strike, or the

long-range airdrops of paratroopers and their equipment without reliance upon

intermediate or in-theater staging bases [Emphasis added]. Air refueling provides

the nuclear-equipped bomber force with the ability to deliver its payload to any

location in the world and recover to a suitable reconstitution base. Combat

operations require air refueling to extend the persistence and endurance as well as

range of all aircraft.

This range extension capability has tremendous potential to enhance the Mobility Air

Force’s velocity supporting the warfighter. The need for this capability was clearly seen during

the historic Nickel Grass operation where C-141s and C-5s delivered weapons and supplies to

Israel enabling them to prosecute and win a war before the first supply ship arrived. As a result

of the experiences in Nickel Grass, the Air Force sought to expand its air refueling capability.

The capability was crucial to the success of Desert Shield. It was the availability of air refueling

that allowed many airlifters to operate at their maximum wartime gross weight that would

normally limit their range.

Given the range extension advantage offered by A/R for a C-17, the following map

shows how much of the globe can be reached from the CONUS in a basic crew duty day. Only

the Indian Ocean region from southern/eastern Africa to Australia is outside the aircraft’s reach.

This is a powerful warfighting capability that must remain in the MAF’s arsenal for use.

Accommodating the range extension capabilities afforded by A/R entails accepting a

level of risk in airlift operations. These risks include the airlift asset not being air refueled due to

weather (turbulence, clouds or icing), airspace limitations, mechanical malfunction, or tanker

availability forcing the airlifter to land short of its intended destination. Furthermore, providing

air refueling of airlift assets is intrinsically inefficient and should only be used to meet

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operationally necessary timelines or conditions. It’s far more costly in terms of fuel expenditure

to launch a tanker than it is to schedule an en route stop along the airlifter’s route. While we can

certainly consider/plan for the use of A/R in extending the range of airlifters, we certainly cannot

discount the possibility that A/R will not be available. If the en route system is not structured to

accommodate this possibility, we risk that our airlift assets may land at a location where there

may be no support. This was not a risk the original strategists were willing to assume.

However, when one looks at the most notable uses of A/R through history, the focus

tends to fall on range extension for the bomber fleet in operations like Operation EL DORADO

CANYON (F-111s attack Libyan targets) and the first combat sorties of DESERT STORM when

Barksdale AFB B-52s departed Louisiana on 35-hour non-stop, round-trip missions to launch

cruise missiles. The other high-profile mission for A/R assets is extending loitering time for

fighters engaged in tactical operations. Additionally, during the Kosovo war, Air Force tankers

provided ninety percent of all A/Rs for the NATO forces. These operations highlight the

competition for limited A/R resources.

9. AIR REFUELING (A/R) EMPLOYMENT:

Employment of the A/R assets is directed by an entirely different set of requirements than

the employment of airlift assets. Rather than being dictated by the point-to-point delivery of

cargo and passengers, tankers receive their requirements from the needs of those they intend to

serve—receivers. In their primary role, tankers need to be responsive to when and where

receivers require refueling. This could mean their primary mission is loitering over the ocean to

permit fighters to fly non-stop from their CONUS base to an overseas location. Or they could

orbit in the AOR affording attack aircraft added patrol time. Or they could be at locations

strategically placed to allow heavily-laden airlifters the opportunity to deliver their cargo non-

stop from the factory to the foxhole.

Consequently, designing an en route system for tankers operating in their air refueling

role would entail knowing where the tankers would be expected to provide air refueling.

Admittedly, this is a very operations-dependent determination and difficult for a strategy to

anticipate. However, we can suggest likely locations to ensure they are capable for tanker

operations based on historic use and known air refueling tracks.

Because the requirement for tankers operating as air refuelers is based on where the

receivers are when they need refueling and not on the great circle range of a point-to-point

mission, the decision matrix for where to locate them is fundamentally different. Helping us

with the decision matrix is the fact that in many places of the world, air refueling is tightly

controlled and the airspace strictly bounded. When an aircraft is planned to receive air refueling,

it’s typically within the confines of an established reserved airspace. Consequently, we should

look for tanker en route locations in the proximity of these reserved air refueling areas.

In the Atlantic region, there are numerous areas reserved for air refueling off the west

coast of Great Britain, France, and Spain. There are also A/R routes in Germany (though these

are primarily for training and supported with USAFE assets), through the Mediterranean and

near the Azores Islands. Fortunately, there are existing Tier III en route locations very near each

of these regions. These Tier III locations by definition expect little airlift throughput. Therefore,

provided adequate parking space is available, they would be ideal locations for self-deploying

tankers to recover to or launch from in support of A/R missions. The locations we would suggest

then as A/R tanker mission en route locations are Mildenhall, Fairford, Moron, Sigonella or

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Souda Bay, and Lajes (Sigonella will be discussed further below as a potential tanker task force

location). Each of these locations has more than adequate parking for tankers operating as A/R

platforms.

A limitation at Sigonella is runway length. Presently, Sigonella has an 8,000 foot

runway. As long as we maintain KC-135s in the inventory through the strategy period, which is

expected, the temperature and runway length will be a limiting factor (primarily for emergency

returns). Therefore, we recommend and support a runway extension of 2,000 feet at Sigonella to

the Navy and Italian government before using Sigonella as a primary TTF location.

In the Pacific region, tankers suffer the same constraints that airlift aircraft have—lack of

available real estate, especially along the Southern route. Should tankers perform A/R for

aircraft transiting the Southern route, they have no choice but to use the same en route locations

as identified for airlift aircraft. Hickam, Andersen and Kadena are all key locations for tankers.

With the buildup of forces at Andersen during the strategy period maximum use of the

anticipated tanker task force should be planned. However, should this task force be unavailable,

planner should consider avoiding Andersen with transiting tankers due to the potential for

congestion.

On the other hand, the Northern route offers Tier III location well suited to tanker en

route operations. In Alaska, the use of either Elmendorf or Eielson would allow tankers to refuel

aircraft over the Aleutians and using the Tier III location at Misawa would allow access to A/R

routes near the Japanese islands.

Finally, U-Taphao and Diego Garcia are ideal locations for aircraft heading west or for

operations in their areas.

Historically, the use of tankers in their cargo mode has been limited. Approximately only

10 percent of air refueling missions have operated in a cargo-carrying mode. However, with the

shift towards capabilities-based planning, the airlift role of air refueling assets is expected to be

emphasized in the future.

The cargo capability of KC-135s is minimal—6 pallets or 18 short tons. The capability

of KC-10s is more extensive—23 pallets or 60 short tons. Certainly the cargo capacity of the

limited number of KC-10s is a considerable capability that the mobility system relies on. In

addition, the future cargo capacity of the KC-X promises to be extensive. Their ability to

augment the organic airlift fleet should be planned for and incorporated into any airlift strategy.

When integrating tankers into the airlift strategy, it must be recognized that neither of the

present-day aircraft have roll-on/roll-off capability and require specialized material handling

equipment to reach the side door. Furthermore, when these aircraft do operate in a cargo mode,

the air refueling capability is reduced due to weight restrictions.

Nevertheless, the demand for their air refueling capability, coupled with the

aforementioned weight limitations while in the airlift role, means that the opportunities for

tankers to haul cargo are minimal. Even robust forecasts plan on approximately 20 percent of

total air refueling missions to operate in a cargo role. Given these indicators, we recommend that

tankers, when operating in the airlift role, operate through the en route locations most appropriate

for the cargo movement. Consequently, tankers operating in a TWCF airlift role, controlled by

618 TACC, use the en route system just as the C-17s or C-5s would. Neither manning nor

infrastructure would need to be increased to accommodate the expected minor increase in flow

this capability represents.

There are locations where basing a unit of tankers would not only serve heavily used air

refueling routes, but also provide freight and passenger capabilities should that role be assigned

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to the tankers. These locations would represent the most efficient basing of tanker assets. In the

past, a deployment of a quantity of tankers to support an air refueling operation was known as a

tanker task force. We recommend redefining this term to include the basing of tanker assets at a

deployed location for the purposes of either or both air refueling and airlift operations.

Consequently, a TTF could be employed to provide air refueling to a given operation or to fulfill

a known airlift need or in support of both operations.

The parameters used to determine the optimal location for a tanker task force are

relatively straightforward—1. Proximity to established air refueling tracks, and 2. Proximity to

major airlift routes. Given these parameters, there are a large number of air refueling areas

around the United Kingdom, Germany, and extending from east of Crete to Sardinia in the

Mediterranean. Mildenhall, which is already configured to bed-down a tanker deployment,

would have ready access to the UK and German air refueling areas for use by either eastbound or

westbound mobility aircraft using the North Atlantic route. In the Mediterranean, Souda Bay,

Crete, Sigonella, Sicily, Incirlik, or Moron, Spain, from which the Mediterranean A/R routes

could be accessed, could provide support to the Central Atlantic route.

One location, in particular—Sigonella—provides us unique capability options and

efficiencies the other locations do not. Because the Defense Logistics Agency has established a

major warehouse capability, supplies destined for Africa may be congregated at Sigonella. We

can, then, easily imagine a scenario where on a day-to-day basis the TTF could refuel aircraft

entering or exiting the SW Asia AOR. Should a situation arise that small quantities of cargo

need to be airlifted to an African operation, the tankers in the TTF could then be pressed into

their dual role and carry the cargo onto the African continent (provided high-lift capable MMHE

is available at the APOD). Or, if the quantity of cargo to be moved is large, provide infil/exfil air

refueling for the African bound airlifters. Furthermore, the ability to resupply the fuel stocks via

sea LOCs from the Mediterranean could ensure more reliable supply of fuel in greater quantities.

Given this type of capability, we find the location of a TTF at Sigonella most reasonable.

As a side note, in the Mediterranean we have the option of seeking synergy with NATO,

who is also reviewing locations for their Air Refueling Capability Package. Consequently, we

suggest that any TTF location in the Mediterranean be predicated on the results of the NATO site

selection and that AMC be a strong proponent of a NATO Air Refueling Capability Package

located at Sigonella.

A TTF along the southern airlift route would help ensure that airlifters could deliver their

cargo on the continent without requiring fuel at the APOD. As will be discussed in the en route

strategy, the quality or availability of fuel on the continent is often questionable. Therefore, a

TTF located to provide air refueling for airlifters during either infil or exfil could maximize the

range of cargo delivery. To that end, we recommend that when a large airlift operation is

expected along the southern Atlantic route, an expeditionary TTF be deployed to Ascension

Island.

In the Pacific, we do not recommend a mobility TTF located at Andersen AFB once the

GIMDP relocations are complete. The congestion anticipated at the base, especially in the event

of a contingency, will render parking a TTF difficult. Instead, we suggest that any TTF for the

Southern route be sited at Hickam and/or Kadena with Hickam as the preferred location. A

Northern TTF could be sited at Eielson.

10. THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS OF AFRICAN COVERAGE:

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The African strategy is a work in progress. To date, USAFRICOM has not developed a

long-term strategy from which airlift requirements can be derived. This is despite the fact that

senior USAFRICOM officials are convinced that support for their efforts will require extensive

strategic airlift. General Ward, USAFRICOM Commander, has stated ―Predictable, reliable

inter- and intra-continental lift...is so important for us today, as we then are postured and in a

stance that will enable us to lead activity that helps to assure stability, as opposed to just reacting

to a crisis," Clearly, there is the expectation that airlift support will be crucial.

However, infrastructure on the African continent for supporting strategic airlift

movements is noticeable in its absence. Coastal locations, such as Dakar, Senegal, often have

infrastructure capable of handling strategic airlift, but the infrastructure in the continent’s interior

is either absent or seriously degraded. Additionally, the coastal infrastructure is suffering. A

recent USTRANSCOM survey of select African airfields revealed that infrastructure is degraded,

poorly maintained or inadequate for sustained strategic airlift movement. Probably the most

disturbing limitation is in the quantity and quality of aviation fuel. This limitation was

highlighted during a spring 2008 POTUS trip on the continent. Considerable air refueling assets

had to be used to offset the lack of fuel in sufficient quantities or of acceptable quality.

Further complicating the problem are statements from senior government leaders

pledging that there will be no permanent basing on the African continent. While this doesn’t

seem to preclude an expeditionary presence, the net effect seems to be that anything more than

transient and infrequent strategic airlift will be difficult or impossible to sustain from an African

location. Fortunately, there is already an established base on the continent at Camp Lemonier in

Djibouti and it appears to be enduring.

A promising method of delivering cargo by airlift is relying on the range of unrefueled

strategic airlifters. As was previously mentioned, a C-17 can travel 2,000 NM, perform an

engine running offload at the destination and return to the original departure location without

refueling. Consequently, if a C-17 departs from a location on the perimeter of Africa, it can

cover a rather large area of the continent. In fact, if one draws a 2,000 NM arc from some key

locations, nearly the entire continent, with the exception of the southern tip, falls into one of the

arcs.

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(This, of course, is a rather simplistic view of achieving coverage of the continent. It

does not account for known restrictions to aerial delivery, such as overflight restrictions and

minimal air route structures.)

Consequently, the southern route of the Atlantic en route strategy seeks to take advantage

of locations on the perimeter of Africa by using the unrefueled range of a C-17. The southern

route shares many of the locations with the central route, in particular, those on the

Mediterranean.

11. THE ATLANTIC (EUROPEAN/AFRICAN) STRATEGY:

The proposed European strategy should be more appropriately called the Atlantic

strategy. The names of the routes that define the strategy are based on their relative position over

the Atlantic Ocean. Renaming also limits the notion that a regional command owns a portion of

the en route system.

The ancestor strategy in this region was known as ―6-Lose-1‖ and ―Global En Route

Strategy, USEUCOM.‖ The strategy was based on a ―lens,‖ or a ―sweet spot‖, for strategic

airlift operations (see map on page 20). Given a 3,500 NM point-to-point range of a C-17, the

right-hand side of the lens defined the distance strategic airlift could fly from a mid-Atlantic

CONUS location while the left-hand side of the lens defined the distance from a south-west

Asian location. The area bounded by the two range rings is the lens—locations that could be

reached from either the CONUS or SW Asia. To maximize the functionality of this concept, the

6-Lose-1 strategy focused on making the six primary locations in the lens region as strategic

airlift-capable as possible.

The lens actually describes physical and technological limitations of the strategic airlift

fleet laid on the geographic landscape. Those limitations have not changed, and given the pace

of fielding technological advances, they will not have changed by 2025. Consequently, the

concept of the lens will be no less valid in 2025 than it was when it was first conceived.

Therefore, we are not abandoning the lens concept. Instead, we will refine its utility.

The following graphic depicts the airlift workload in 2007. The majority of the workload

that crossed the Atlantic on its way to the warfighter passed through Ramstein AB. Ramstein

represents the most capable en route airlift throughput location in the eastern hemisphere. Not

only does it have the most advanced and thorough capability, but it’s also ideally situated along

the great circle route to the USCENTCOM AOR and is centrally located within the lens. Paired

with the relief location of Spangdahlem AB, it makes an ideal location on which to base a

northern routing across the Atlantic.

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If one looks at pure great circle routing from the east coast to Baghdad, Djibouti, or

Ghana, one will begin to see the genesis for the routing strategy we propose to adopt. We

propose that there are three primary distribution routes for supplying the warfighter—northern,

central and southern routes. These Atlantic routes have the advantage of providing overlap for

each other. In other words, should the northern Atlantic route not be available for weather,

political or saturation reasons, supplies en route to southern Eurasia or southwest Asia can be

routed through the central route. The central route also provides access, with the southern route,

to the African continent. This feature of the Atlantic routes leads us to postulate an alternate

name for the Atlantic strategy—―Three-Use-Two.‖ In other words, we have three routes across

the Atlantic and for any given action in one of the areas of interest, two of the routes are

available for delivering supplies to those areas.

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The most direct routing (and the most fuel efficient routing) to southwest Asia or

Southern Eurasia, carries us across northern and eastern Europe. Mildenhall, Spangdahlem,

Ramstein, Constanta, and Incirlik all lie within close proximity of this northerly route. These

bases possess the most robust existing infrastructure in the entire theater. However, the northern

route is hindered by poor weather and limited operating hours at nearly all locations, which make

planning and scheduling across international boundaries problematic. This latter issue includes

rerouting to accommodate political sensitivities.

Along the northern route, our most capable location with the greatest throughput

capability is Ramstein AB. Its massive mobility ramp, state-of-the-art freight facility, and C-5

capable hangar make it Europe’s only Tier 1 location at present. Its paired location,

Spangdahlem AB, has lesser throughput capability, but is robust in its own right. We suggest

that to provide adequate throughput along the northern route, Spangdahlem should remain a Tier

II location and should be considered an essential pairing with Ramstein.

RAF Mildenhall remains a strategically crucial en route location. Located on perhaps the

most politically friendly country in Europe, it will be valuable for basing mobility operations

should operations become politically more problematic across the European continent (an

example of which was Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the bombing raid into Libya). The

base has a robust passenger and freight handling capability we should not abandon. It is also a

valuable resource should mechanical problems force an aircraft to stop short either east- or west-

bound. However, as velocity has driven consolidation of organic airlift assets for efficiency,

Mildenhall has increasingly been overflown by our organic fleet in favor of the locations in

Germany. Recognizing this fact, we recommend that Mildenhall downsize to a Tier III location.

In the British Isles, a more central location on the great circle route between the east coast

of the US and the Persian Gulf is Shannon, Ireland. Presently, AMC contract commercial

carriers use Shannon as a fuel stop as they return to the CONUS. Due to its central location, it

would be an ideal gas-and-go location. However, any AMC presence there would be duplicative

of the presence at Mildenhall and fails to recognize the existing efforts to consolidate throughput

for efficiencies. Consequently, we recommend that the Tier III presence at Mildenhall be

capable of moving TDY personnel augmented from CONUS locations to man the expeditionary

gas-and-go capability at Shannon.

Our experiences during Desert Shield/Storm and OEF/OIF have highlighted the

importance of en route locations subsequent to the first leg en routes. Both Incirlik AB and Al

Udeid AB are crucial as transload locations—a transition from intratheater to intertheater. As

such, their throughput capability is crucial to ongoing operations. Additionally, both have

proven their value during OEF/OIF. With continued areas of interest in this region, transload

capability will continue to be crucial. Consequently, we recommend that both Incirlik and Al

Udeid be upgraded to Tier II locations.

Air mobility operations at Al Mubarak AB, Kuwait, have endured since the end of

Operation DESERT SHIELD. This large capacity aerial port provides a vital distribution link in

support of CENTCOM operations and is tied directly into the Defense Distribution Depot

Kuwait-South West Asia (DDKS) and the Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point (TCSP).

Based on the historical workload and its key multi-modal distribution capability, we maintain Al

Mubarak as a Tier II location.

Southern Eurasia is a developing area of interest and USEUCOM is already establishing

a presence in Romania in response. US Army Europe (USAEUR) now has a major training

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range and center of operations in the area around Constanta, Romania. Mobility will be required

to support these and developing operations in the area. A number of options for a Tier III

location appear suitable to take advantage of the seaports on the Black Sea. They include

Odepeni, Romania, Mihail Kogalniceanu Airport, Romania (LRCK), Varna, Bulgaria (LBWN)

and Burgas, Bulgaria (LBBG). All have runways that are more than 8,000 feet in length, are in

close proximity to sea ports (with the exception of Odepeni), and would require some degree of

repairs or construction to make them suitable for transiting MAF aircraft.

A second Tier III recommendation is for Bagram AB, Afghanistan. We anticipate that

our need for a mobility throughput location in the region will endure well past 2025. Military or

stability support will be a hallmark of the region. Despite its high altitude and dangerous

topography, the current infrastructure and planned infrastructure by USCENTCOM makes

Bagram an ideal location for mobility operations. Based on its current and projected distribution

mission, Bagram’s port throughput more closely resembles a Tier II location.

Along the northern route there are numerous locations that support mobility operations,

but are closely tied to existing operations. These locations are essential, but may, in fact, be

temporary and only needed during contingency/wartime operations. RAF Fairford, Kuwait-Ali

Al Salem, Kandahar, Papa Hungary, and Bahrain fall into this category.

The most direct routing to the Horn of Africa and eastern African locations is across the

Iberian Peninsula and through the Mediterranean. Rota, Moron, Sigonella, and Souda Bay lie

close to this central Atlantic routing. While not the most fuel efficient, this central routing

through the Mediterranean has advantages over the northern route. The weather is more

consistently conducive to flying operations and there are fewer international overflight issues.

These advantages make it an ideal route for northern route overflow or restrictions. It is also the

ideal route for commencing operations on the African continent. For instance, the air distance

from Rota direct to Djibouti is slightly over 3,000 NM, easily within reach of all our strategic

airlifters. After a refuel stop in Spain, a C-17 or C-5 could reach to south of the equator in

Africa, as long as fuel is available at their destination.

NAVSTA Rota, paired with Moron AB, provides the anchor for the central Atlantic

route. Presently, Rota is our only European base with 24/7 operations and represents a

tremendous capability for the timely movement of supplies to Southwest Asia. Rota also has the

unique attribute of having a seaport attached to the airfield which allows multi-modal operations

to occur within the perimeter of the base. For these reasons, and because we anticipate an

increase in mobility operations destined for Africa, we suggest that Rota be upgraded from its

Tier II status to a Tier I location by enhancing the maintenance footprint. In essence, this would

entail an enhancement of the maintenance capability (backshop).

Moron AB represents tremendous capability with the largest parking ramp in theater and

no threat of noise-restricted hours. Therefore, we recommend that Moron continue as a Tier III

location. To further enhance its capability, we recommend returning Moron to a 24/7 operation

at least during the summer tourist season. Ensuring unrestricted operations at Moron will mean

splitting the traffic destined for the Iberian Peninsula between the two bases.

Sigonella and Souda Bay present unique issues for the central route. At 4,100NM and

4,500NM respectively, they are too distant for a first leg from the CONUS. However, they are

well within C-17 range from both Afghanistan and Qatar. The real value of Sigonella and Souda

lies in their location in the Mediterranean, extensive Defense Logistics Agency’s warehousing

infrastructure in Sicily, and their proximity to Africa. Access to both locations can be achieved

via relatively unrestricted overflight of the Mediterranean. The Headquarters Defense Logistics

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Agency is building a regional headquarters logistics supply stores on Sicily, which will result in

greater cargo generation for delivery to or from Sigonella. Finally, due to the extensive

European colonial history in sub-Saharan Africa, access to the African continent may be

politically untenable from any number of locations depending on the overflight routes and

destination (Greece, and so Souda Bay, is not among the African colonial powers). Having

alternative locations from which access to the African continent is possible becomes increasingly

important. Consequently, we recommend Sigonella become a Tier II location with the addition

of an air mobility squadron and Souda Bay become an expeditionary location capable of

becoming a Tier III location requiring parking ramp expansion and mobility operations

capabilities. We make this recommendation recognizing that interest in Sigonella as a location

for basing UAVs is increasing. Therefore, we will work closely with USAFE and the Navy to

determine the ability of Sigonella to handle an increased mobility mission.

The central Atlantic route shares many second leg locations with the northern route. For

example, Incirlik and Al Udeid would be second leg Tier II locations while Bagram would be a

second leg Tier III location. A second leg location unique to the central route would be Aviano,

a Tier III location primarily to support Army units in that region.

In addition to those locations mentioned for the northern route and previously mentioned

Souda Bay, another expeditionary central route location would be Cairo West, which is a key

location for numerous USCENTCOM exercises.

Finally, the southern Atlantic route is designed solely to provide mobility support to the

African continent. As previously mentioned, the proposed strategy takes advantage of locations

on the perimeter of the continent. In this regard, the southern route shares many locations with

the central route—Rota, Moron, Sigonella, Souda Bay, and Cairo West.

An additional location, not mentioned as part of the central route, but could be considered

part of that route, is Lajes Air Field. Again, Lajes is a location that fighters find crucial for

crossing the Atlantic; however, due to its proximity to the CONUS, it is infrequently used by

mobility aircraft and only then primarily to support the airfield. Additionally, the Azores are

frequently battered by strong winds during the winter that effectively shuts down operations.

With the anticipated increase in African mobility requirements, Lajes’ role as a portal onto the

African continent may increase. Additionally, since Lajes is an island situated in the Atlantic, it

makes an ideal divert location for aircraft crossing the Atlantic. Consequently, we do not

recommend abandoning Lajes. Although there are locations from which African access is easier

and more effective, Lajes is an important backup location and we recommend maintaining the

option for its use, but downgrading Lajes from its current status to an expeditionary location.

Two locations, unique to the southern routing and essential for airlift coverage of Africa,

are Ascension Island (Wide Awake Field) and Camp Lemonier, Djibouti. Ascension is a British

owned island in the south Atlantic. Its location south of the equator and midway between South

America and Africa makes it ideal for access to west and southwestern Africa. US military

aircraft have used Ascension in the past, and we anticipate no problems for continued use.

However, the increased traffic to support USAFRICOM could involve an expanded parking

ramp and fuel storage. These enhancements, as well as increased use, would need to be

negotiated with the United Kingdom.

Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, is the only permanent infrastructure on the African continent

that this strategy assumes. As such, its importance can’t be overstated. Of all the locations on

the southern route, Djibouti provides the single point of greatest coverage. Using the 3,500NM

point-to-point C-17 range, the entire continent can be accessed. Using the 2,000NM unrefueled

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range, two-thirds of the continent can be accessed. Currently, the airfield has limited mobility

aircraft servicing capability. An enlarged parking ramp and freight handling capability would be

required to establish a Tier III capability as we envision. (Should analysis of the evolving

requirements (to include responsiveness, timeliness, and MHE/personnel required to provide the

needed capability) dictate and political dialogue permit an expeditionary location on the west

coast of Africa, options do exist and will be evaluated.)

The following map graphically depicts the Atlantic ―three-use-two‖ route strategy

described above:

12. SOUTH AMERICAN STRATEGY:

Including South America in a global en route strategy accomplishes two results: it helps

achieve the regional engagement strategy and assists with the mobility routing to Africa.

Unfortunately, a South American engagement strategy that tasks airlift assets is not available.

Until recently, security concerns in South America have focused on the counter-narcotics

mission. That mission has not required the use of strategic airlift in its prosecution.

Recently, USSOUTHCOM has become interested in establishing a location on the South

American continent that could be used both for counter-narcotics operations and as a location

from which mobility operations could be executed. Consequently, with the assistance of AMC

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and USTRANSCOM, USSOUTHCOM has identified Palanquero, Colombia (German Olano

Airfield (SKPQ)), as a cooperative security location (CSL). From this location, nearly half of the

continent can be covered by a C-17 without refueling. Should suitable fuel be available at the

destination, a C-17 could cover the entire continent, with the exception of the Cape Horn region

in Chile and Argentina. Until such time that USSOUTHCOM establishes a more robust theater

engagement plan, the strategy to place a CSL at Palanquero should be sufficient for air mobility

reach on the South American continent.

In conjunction with the aforementioned CSL, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands offer

viable en route locations capable of supporting theater mobility requirements. Both San Juan

and Henry Rohlsen International Airports have resident Air National Guard facilities that

currently support mobility operations into South America. Puerto Rico and the US Virgin

Islands have two of the largest sea ports in the Caribbean, minutes away from their respective

international airports facilitating intermodal operations. Neither location requires international

agreements, customs, or diplomatic clearances for overflight. These two airfields offer ideal hub

locations to support emerging contingency and humanitarian relief operations. Finally, AMC

should work closely with USTRANSCOM to establish contracts or agreements with commercial

concerns for contingency fuel and aircraft support at airfields in more southern reaches of the

continent.

Previously, we discussed using Ascension Island as a portal for access to the African

continent. Routing to Ascension, though, requires an intermediate fuel stop and that stop would

be in the Caribbean or South American region. The distance from Charleston AFB to Ascension

is over 5,100NM, well outside an unrefueled C-17’s range. In the past, AMC aircraft on their

way to Ascension stop in Antigua (V.C. Bird International) to refuel. The distance from

Charleston AFB to Antigua is nearly 1,600NM with the remaining distance to Ascension being

cut to 3,600NM.

USSOUTHCOM, in an attempt to assist with access to Africa, has postulated that

Cayenne, French Guiana, could serve as a possible CSL for an intermediate fuel stop between

the CONUS and Ascension. The distance from Charleston AFB to Cayenne is 2,600NM and the

remaining distance to Ascension is only 2,400NM. USSOUTHCOM has also considered access

to the airport at Recife, Brazil. A C-17 could depart from this location and, provided fuel is

available when they land, cover approximately the same area as an unrefueled C-17 from

Ascension. However, the political relationship with Brazil is not conducive to the necessary

agreements. Furthermore, Recife is 4,100NM from Charleston AFB placing it just outside the

point-to-point distance for a C-17. Therefore, we recommend that USSOUTHCOM continue to

pursue access to the airfield at Cayenne, French Guiana.

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13. PACIFIC STRATEGY:

As discussed, the limited availability of real estate in the Pacific allows few options for

en route locations. Fortunately, the location and political affiliation of Pacific islands provide en

route strategy options to prevent reliance on a single route to the warfighter.

This fact was clearly recognized in 1999 when the PERISC first postulated the ―2-Lose-

1‖ route strategy. Recognizing that one of the routes may be temporarily unavailable due to

inclement weather, the PERISC recommended sizing the locations on the two routes such that

one route could handle the temporary surge of the other being unavailable. Given the limitations

of the region, we agree that this strategy is sound and should be continued.

However, since 1999 the focus areas in this region have expanded to include the

Indonesian islands as a source of political turmoil and geologic instability. Furthermore, the

existing en route locations are subject to refinement to make the system more responsive and

capable. Consequently, we now refer to the strategy in this region as the ―Two Route Plus‖

strategy. The strategy still refers to two primary routes, the Northern and Southern routes. The

―Plus‖ alludes to the fact that our refinement of the strategy enhances what the PERISC

originally proposed in 1999.

Page 24

The Northern route more closely follows the great circle routing to the Korean peninsula

and China Sea areas of interest, making it the more fuel efficient routing to two of the three areas

of interest. However, due to its northern orientation, the impact of winter weather is severe and

requires locations along the route to be adequately supplied with deicing and snow removal

equipment. Furthermore, because the Northern routes depend on the Japanese locations of

Misawa, Yokota, and Iwakuni for its second leg stop and that Japan is close to both northerly

areas of interest, the threat from battle damage on Japanese locations is proportionately higher

than at more outlying locations.

The Southern route, on the other hand, is far less fuel efficient and represents an actual

increase in distance to the areas of interest. For example, the distance from Travis AFB to Osan

AB, Korea, using the Northern route is approximately 5,300NM. From Travis to Osan using the

Southern route it is 6,000NM if flying direct from Hickam to Yokota (2 additional flying hours)

or 7,100NM if routing through Guam (4 more flying hours). Typhoons are a threat in many

locations, but particularly at Guam.

Nevertheless, when not threatened by typhoons, the Southern route boasts far more

predictable and favorable flying weather. Support to the Navy is crucial at many of the Pacific

island locations and the threat from enemy action is more remote along the Southern route.

Historically, the flow of Pacific airlift is through the Southern route due to these very issues.

Due, in part, to the basing of C-17s at both Hickam AFB and Elmendorf AFB, the Pacific

has the luxury of two Tier I locations, one on each route. Hickam is manned and has the

infrastructure to provide Tier I capability. This is a crucial capability to mitigate the chokepoints

along the Mid-Pacific route.

Chokepoints are points along the route where there are few, if any, available alternates

should the single location be unavailable. In nearly all instances, a primary location on a route is

paired with a location of lesser capability that can serve as an alternate. For example, Elmendorf

is paired with Eielson, Rota with Moron, and Ramstein with Spangdahlem. However, on the

Southern route, Hickam AFB and Andersen AFB are not paired with alternates. While alternate

locations exist in the Hawaiian Islands for diversion, Hawaii isn’t frequently threatened by

inclement weather and there is very little threat from enemy attack. The need for an alternate

location is less compelling. Consequently, it is prudent to ensure that Hickam maintains a Tier I

capability. Proposed alternate locations for Andersen AFB will be discussed later in this

document.

Elmendorf currently possesses the infrastructure for Tier I capability, but it is not

currently manned to accomplish Tier I activities. Since Eielson is used as an alternate location

and there is a greater likelihood that Northern Pacific routing will not be used due to inclement

weather, the need for Tier I capability is not critical at Elmendorf. Consequently, we suggest

that Elmendorf maintain Tier I infrastructure while maintaining its current manning.

The second legs in the Pacific strategy are considerably more controversial. On the one

hand, the second leg locations on the Island of Japan are somewhat fixed and their tier sizes seem

driven by momentum rather than strategic importance. On the other hand, the second leg

location at Andersen AFB represents perhaps the most significant air mobility chokepoint on the

entire globe.

Currently, there are four en route locations on Japan—Misawa in the north, Yokota near

Tokyo, Iwakuni on a deep-water bay in the south of the main island, and Kadena on the island of

Okinawa. Each has varying degrees of capability with Yokota and Kadena representing the

greatest throughput capability. At the locations other than Yokota, mobility operations are

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considered an adjunct mission to the primary missions. In fact, Iwakuni is a Marine base. AMC

operations at Iwakuni are minimal and are frequently supported with TDY personnel from the

AMS at Yokota. At other times, Marines provide transient aircraft servicing.

Yokota was established post-World War II and maintained as a forward base. Since

WWII, Tokyo has become among the world’s largest cities and the urban sprawl has engulfed

the base. Still, of the four Japanese locations, Yokota’s primary mission, for both PACAF and

AMC, is mobility operations. PACAF maintains C-130 and operational support airlift units at

Yokota and synergies are achieved with AMC mobility throughput. In FY09, construction will

commence on a new mechanized materiel handling system funded nearly entirely by the

Japanese government. Additionally, the base holds a number of USPACOM/PACAF/Joint

Japanese Defense Force headquarters.

However, many challenges exist at Yokota. First, Yokota AB is centrally located in

Japan, but is surrounded by high-density civilian population. In many areas there is no buffer

between the perimeter fence and the civilian population. Additionally departure obstructions

plague the airfield. Second, the regional government routinely makes concerted efforts to

transform Yokota into a joint military/civilian airfield, which would permit civilian use of the

field for freight and passenger service. The US has been successful in staving off these

proposals and, to date, the national government has not supported the prefecture governor’s

proposal for military/civilian dual use. Finally, and most significantly, fuel delivery to the base

is accomplished via railcar. This overland delivery of the airfield’s lifeblood is fraught with

vulnerability and subject to environmental concerns that may make it increasingly politically

unsustainable. Because of these geographic and political constraints, it is prudent to plan for an

alternate location in Japan in the event Yokota become untenable.

An ideal alternate location for Yokota is Iwakuni. Iwakuni’s location on an island

extending into the deep-water Sea of Aki means that only one section of the base perimeter

experiences civilian encroachment, while the rest of the base is surrounded by water. Although

the water boundary limits civilian encroachment, it also limits the ability to expand the base.

Nevertheless, there is a land reclamation project currently underway to build a second runway.

The new 10,000 foot runway is expected to be operational by 2010.

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Perhaps the most promising and useful feature at Iwakuni is the deep-water port attached

to the base availing multi-modal capability comparable to that found at NAS Rota, Spain. This is

a key advantage for any operating location. The ability to trans-load from ship to aircraft or

aircraft to ship maximizes the limited space available in the theater. Furthermore, fuel for the

base is delivered from ship within the confines of the base perimeter, significantly reducing force

protection concerns.

Iwakuni is not without limitations. The most obvious limitation, when compared with

Yokota, is that construction would have to occur to enhance its throughput capability to a Tier II

level. While a new 4,000 square meter passenger terminal is under construction, there is

inadequate freight handling capability. Additionally, the ramp available for mobility aircraft is

limited in size and should be expanded. It is currently capable of only accommodating three

large aircraft. All proposals to expand capability on the base, either with infrastructure or

personnel, would require agreements with the Marines and the Japanese government.

Consequently, we recommend putting the necessary infrastructure in place at Iwakuni to

make it a Tier II location in the event that we can no longer maintain Yokota at that level. At

present, we do not propose drawing down Yokota to a Tier III location. Rather, we suggest that

Yokota remain Tier II subject to continuing reviews. We do not recommend changes to Misawa

or Kadena.

Andersen AFB, Guam is a Pacific chokepoint of key concern for numerous reasons.

First, it tends to be a common target for Pacific typhoons. Second, the entire island will soon

experience an expanded military presence under the auspices of the Guam Integrated Military

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Development Plan. Third, with the addition of new flying missions, there will be an increased

demand on fuel, which originates at the naval port on the opposite side of the island. Fourth,

should a large-scale regional conflict arise, Guam could very well be subject to battle damage

threats, especially given the confluence of military units gathered on the island. The impact of

these concerns is an increasing threat to airlift throughput at Andersen AFB.

Several issues arise when considering this threat. The existing infrastructure at Guam is

inadequate to support the expanding missions. A new freight terminal to be constructed in the

AMS Campus is currently programmed and will need proper advocacy to compete for MILCON

funds and remain in the FYDP. A new passenger terminal to replace the woefully inadequate

existing terminal is planned and coordinated with the host wing, though it, too, will require

command advocacy to compete in the POM. The current terminals are capable of handling 100

passengers and one C-17 cargo load. Also, the mobility parking ramp should be expanded to

permit additional parking and an accessible footprint for performing required or preventative

maintenance.

Still, these enhancements won’t obviate the concerns raised by weather, encroachment,

fuel delivery, or battle damage. Consequently, we believe it is prudent to seek a paired location

for Andersen—a location close enough to allow continued mobility throughput to Guam during

periods when the base is unavailable during weather, high ops tempo, or fuel demand.

Available airfields in the region are few and far between. Fortunately, at a little over

100NM north of Guam lie the islands of Tinian and Saipan. These islands are in the

Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, which are US possessions. Both islands have

airports, though Saipan’s is the larger of the two. Saipan’s international airport has an 8,700-foot

runway and adequate contingency parking area for wide-body aircraft (two wide-body and three

narrow-body spots). It is close enough to Andersen that if mobility operations needed to be

diverted, they could continue at Saipan, perhaps with a transload to another aircraft to ferry their

cargo to Andersen.

Locating an expeditionary capability at Saipan would require conducting negotiations to

secure guaranteed access and potentially constructing the necessary infrastructure to ensure the

ability to service mobility aircraft, e.g., enlarging the fuel storage capacity. We don’t

recommend a permanent manpower presence at Saipan. Rather, should Saipan be necessary due

to the loss of Andersen for mobility aircraft, personnel from Guam could deploy to Saipan to

establish satellite operations, thus allowing mobility operations to continue on the Southern

route. We will work closely with PACAF to secure access to Saipan or a different, more suitable

location.

Finally, the areas of interest in the south China Seas and Indonesian/Philippine

Archipelago are currently covered by several small locations—Clark, on the Philippines, U-

Taphao in Thailand, Singapore, and Richmond, Australia. The capability inherent in these

locations is based on small throughput and infrequent use. Based on anticipated interest in the

area and seemingly routine natural disasters requiring extensive humanitarian relief, we

recommend establishing a location in the region with more robust capabilities than

expeditionary.

The most robust of these locations is currently the detachment at Singapore’s Paya Lebar

airport. The key mission for this AMS detachment is to service airlift transporting supplies and

support to the large naval port on Singapore. Air access to Singapore is relatively benign from

the east. However, due to overflight restrictions imposed by numerous countries in the region,

departures from Singapore heading westbound require circuitous routing to avoid country

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overflight. Furthermore, the ability to transit hazardous cargo through Singapore is very tightly

regulated.

We presently have an expeditionary location at U-Taphao, Thailand. This location has

more than double the wide-body, narrow-body, and hazardous cargo parking spots than

Singapore and has seven fuel hydrant parking spots. Westbound overflight from U-Taphao is

essentially unrestricted. The capacity to handle large airlift flows to the region far exceeds that

available at Singapore. The infrastructure required to establish U-Taphao as a Tier III location

would be minimal.

Another location in the region to consider is Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam (VVCR).

Relations between the US and Vietnam have warmed significantly over the years. It may now be

possible to pursue negotiations with the Vietnamese for use of an airfield and basing of

personnel. Cam Ranh is a joint use, military and civilian, airfield with 10,000 foot runway and

considerable parking apron space. Arrival at Cam Ranh from the east involves no overflight

restrictions while movement to or from the west involves only minor restrictions. The area of

C-17 coverage in the area is comparable to that available from U-Taphao. Based on these facts

and given the warming relations with Vietnam, we believe that Cam Ranh presents an ideal

opportunity for future basing should the need arise.

Consequently, we recommend keeping Singapore as a location for support of the Navy

port while establishing U-Taphao as a Tier III location to serve as a central location for access

into Indonesia and the South China Sea. Furthermore, we believe that Da Nang airport should be

held in reserve as a potential resource should the need arise and recommend continued

diplomacy with Vietnam for that purpose.

Page 29

14. OTHER LOCATIONS:

An issue related to the en route, but not technically considered part of it, are those

locations most prominently used for fighter ferry missions—Coronets. The most obvious

location is Wake Island Airfield. This location is strategically located for fighters transiting the

Pacific. Without it, they would need to change their routing and would require additional A/Rs

to maintain minimum fuel levels in flight. This fact elevates the importance of Wake for AMC.

Very likely, without it AMC would be required to devote more tankers or risk longer boom times

to these fighter ferry missions. Admittedly, AMC aircraft do land at Wake. For example, from

1 Dec 07 through 30 Nov 08, three C-17s, eight KC-10s and fifteen KC-135s transited Wake

Island. While this does not rise to the level of an en route location necessitating AMC manpower

or equipment, it does not diminish the importance of the island airfield for AMC. Consequently,

maintaining Wake Island as a key Coronet mission location represents a cost and safety risk

avoidance for AMC.

15. LOCATIONS REQUIRING CHANGES:

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While much of this strategy uses existing infrastructure in its present configuration, the

strategy does recommend enhancements and reductions around the globe. To better understand

the recommended changes, we must first clearly understand today’s en route system as it’s

structured in the tier definitions. The following table classifies each of today’s en routes

locations with the most appropriate tier.

Today’s En Route System

(See the appendices for a complete list of en route locations including sites for which there is

contract oversight.)

Now, given the proposed strategy, the en route system in 2025 would be structured as

depicted in the following table:

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2025 En Route System

Tier I

Tier II

Tier III

Expeditionary

Ramstein

Spangdahlem

Mildenhall

Fairford

Singapore

Rota

Incirlik

Bagram

Christchurch

Saipan

Hickam

Al Udeid

Aviano

Kandahar

Lajes

Sigonella

Djibouti

Papa, HGY

Cam Ranh

Andersen

Eielson

Bahrain

Elmendorf

Misawa

Souda Bay

Iwakuni

Moron

Cairo West

Kadena

U-Taphao

Aruba

Yokota

Diego Garcia

Ascension

Kuwait-Al Mubarak

Richmond

Palanquero

Constanta

Antigua

Osan

Clark

Wake

Kuwait-Ali Al Salem

Kunsan

In the Atlantic ―Three-Use-Two‖ strategy the following highlights the proposed changes

that will require dollars or manpower investment:

 Reduce Mildenhall to a Tier III location (an action already planned under the approved

21 EMTF Transformation Plan)

 Establish Bagram, Afghanistan, as a Tier III location; support USCENTCOM plans for

strategic airlift ramp expansion and permanent infrastructure

 Expand ramp and fuels infrastructure at Ascension Island

 Invest in permanent infrastructure at Al Udeid

 Expand ramp and establish permanent infrastructure at Djibouti as a Tier III location

 Plus-up maintenance capability at Rota to elevate it to Tier I capability

 Establish Tier II capability at Sigonella

 Build wide-body capable ramp at Souda Bay

 Establish expeditionary capability at Papa, Hungary

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The changes and required enhancements resulting from the Pacific ―Two Route Plus‖

strategy are as follows:

 Stand up Tier II infrastructure at Iwakuni by expanding the airlift ramp and Material

Handling Capability, but don’t man at Tier II capability (similar to Elmendorf)

 Establish Tier III capability at U-Taphao

 Establish expeditionary access and capability at Saipan

16. COMMERCIAL AIRLIFT

Undeniably, our commercial partners provide a tremendous capability to our mobility

system. Their role in carrying both cargo and passengers frees our organic fleet to carry the

outsized cargo needed by the warfighter. Also, since user’s airlift requirements far exceed the

capacity of the organic fleet, the commercial carriers are often able to help AMC fulfill its

highest priority movements while providing the capacity to move lesser priority requirements.

So, it would seem obvious, given the critical nature of commercial airlift, that the en route

system should accommodate the commercial capability.

However, by agreement, the commercial carriers contracted to AMC only use military

facilities under strictly controlled circumstances. For the most part, commercial carriers use

civilian terminals of their choosing when possible. This is to their benefit, since it is far more

likely for commercial terminals to have some maintenance capability for like aircraft.

Additionally, commercial carriers require FAA-certified parts available at commercial airports.

17. KEYS TO SUCCESS:

For a strategy to succeed, it must be implemented at the operational level, which implies

occasional subordination of operational efficiencies to the greater strategic need and desired

long-term effect. Among the things learned over the years is that if locations aren’t used, they

will be lost, either to budget cutting measures or to host nation designs. For example, the closure

of Zaragoza AB in Spain in 1996 by USAFE to meet budgetary constraints, and the Spanish

decision in the same year to deny the US access to Torrejon AB. The natural inclination, for

ease of operations and to minimize costs, is to consolidate operations in as few locations as

possible. We see this inclination reflected in the fact that approximately 75 percent of today’s

Atlantic operations flow through Ramstein AB. The notion is that even though the planners want

the other locations for contingencies and surges, the fewer locations they have to plan to, the

better. This, unfortunately, opens the other locations to scrutiny from those looking for

budgetary savings today instead of looking at the strategy and needs of the future. Consequently,

to secure access to locations required during contingencies or surges, we must be willing to

operate in a distributed manner, even if this means a loss of day-to-day efficiency. This requires

exercising the assets at those locations deemed necessary in the strategy. Should we not

distribute our flow through all the en route locations and subsequently lose access to them, we

have hindered our own ability to operate and have short-changed what the national defense

expects of us.

To a large degree, any en route strategy will rely on the hospitality and support of

regional services, MAJCOMs, and CCDRs. It is imperative that these services, MAJCOMs and

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CCDRs agree with and support the strategy. Furthermore, the strategy should be shared with

NATO for the purpose of coordination with NATO Capability Packages (CP). Should NATO

see benefits for their CPs, the possibility exists for NATO funds to help secure some of the

recommended enhancements. Consequently, it is crucial that this strategy be ―taken on the road‖

to both inform and secure concurrence from the regional players.

The strategy will also involve Host Nation Notification to those nations where changes

are being recommended. In some instances, host nation funding may be secured for some of the

enhancements. In others, host nations are sensitive to changes in US military presence. A

comprehensive diplomatic engagement strategy is necessary to ensure the ability to prosecute the

strategy.

Access to many global locations will occur via commercial concerns. For example,

South America and Africa, with little or no enduring US military presence, will rely on

commercial airports to service AMC aircraft. AMC should support USTRANSCOM efforts to

secure cooperative security location agreements with these and other countries and cooperative

commercial contracts around the world.

Finally, the strategy cannot be static. It must adjust and adapt to changes in the National

priorities, political landscape and fiscal constraints. To that end, we recommend that every two

years, the command undertake a comprehensive review of the en route strategy. The results may

be to continue with this strategy, an adjustment to these recommendations or a complete

overhaul based on changing requirements.

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Appendix 1

Existing Atlantic En Route Capabilities

Location

ICAO

WB Spots

NB Spots

Haz Cargo

WMOG (Mx)

Hydrants

Ramstein

ETAR

(and) 12

2 C-5/4 C-17

Spangdahlem

ETAD

Mildenhall

EGUN

(or) 8

1 C-5/2 C-17

(MRT only

after 1 Oct 08)

Incirlik

LTAG

Al Udied

OTBH

12 (C-17s)

1 C-5/4 C-17

Bagram

OAIX

2 WB/4 NB

Rota

LERT

Moron

LEMO

MRT

Sigonella

LICZ

MRT

Aviano

LIPA

(or) 20

Souda Bay

LGSA

MRT

Lajes

LPLA

MRT

Ascension

FHAW

MRT

Djibouti

HDAM

Kandahar

OAKN

Kuwait

OKAS

Al Mubarak

OKBK

N/A

Cairo West

HECW

MRT

Fairford

EGVA

* The 521 AMOW also provides oversight of contracts and air mobility operations

at Fujairah, Tel Aviv, Naples, Bahrain, Jebel Ali, Manas and Ali Al Salem.

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Appendix 2

Existing Pacific En Route Capabilities

Location

ICAO

WB Spots

NB Spots

Haz Cargo

WMOG (Mx)

Hydrants

Hickam

PHIK

Elmendorf

PAED

3(2)

Eielson

PAEI

8/16

1 w/TA assist

Yokota

RJTY

Misawa

RJSM

Iwakuni

RJOI

Kadena

RODN

Osan

RKSO

Andersen

PGUA

Kunsan/Kimhae

RKJK

2/1

4/2

1/0

1/1

U-Taphao

VTBU

N/A

Richmond

YSRI

Singapore

WSAP

Diego Garcia

FJDG

N/A

Clark

RPLC

N/A

* The 515 AMOW also provides oversight of contracts and air mobility operations

at Pago Pago, Fukuoka, Alice Springs, Atsugi, Don Muang, Jakarta, Kwajalein

Atoll, Wake Island and Zamboanga.

Page 36

Appendix 3

Aerial Port Tier Classifications - 2025

Tier I

Tier II

Tier III

Expeditionary

Ramstein

Yokota

Aviano

Singapore

Fairford

Ascension

Kuwait-Al

Mubarak

Rota

Cairo

Sigonella

Balad

Antigua

Kadena

Clark

Osan

Kandahar

U-Taphao

Incirlik

Iwakuni

Lajes

Bahrain

Christchurch

Al Udeid

Moron

Elmendorf

Djibouti

Shannon

Hickam

Tel Aviv

Mildenhall

Souda Bay

Kuwait-Ali Al

Salem

Andersen

Richmond

Spangdahlem

Ali Al Salem

Eielson

Misawa

Bagram

Diego Garcia

Aruba